Interdependent Value Multi-unit Auctions for Initial Allocation of Emission Permits  by Wang, Ya-juan & Wang, Xian-jia
 Procedia Environmental Sciences  31 ( 2016 )  812 – 816 
1878-0296 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Tsinghua University/ Basel Convention Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific
doi: 10.1016/j.proenv.2016.02.080 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
The Tenth International Conference on Waste Management and Technology (ICWMT) 
Interdependent value multi-unit auctions for initial allocation of 
emission permits 
Ya-juan Wang a,*, Xian-jia Wang b 
aSchool of Management; Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China; 
bSchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China  
Abstract 
Auctions have been shown to be able to tackle the efficient allocation of initial emission permits, but most of existing works only consider the 
problem with private values. They can not deal with the information externalities that each polluter’s value depends on his own private information 
as well as the information of other polluters. In this paper, we model the allocation problem of initial emission permits as a multi-unit auction with 
interdependent values and propose a mechanism. First, we give the assumptions, i.e., each polluter is allowed to submit a series of marginal value 
functions which are declining in the number of units allocated, each polluter’s signal to marginal values is independent private information and his 
marginal values are interdependent. Second, we establish a designing model for efficient multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values 
according to above assumptions. Third, we get the auction mechanism by solving this model and give the detail steps to show how to implement 
the auction mechanism in practice. Finally, we give an application example to show the operability of the auction mechanism proposed by this 
paper. The conclusion can be drawn that our auction mechanism can prevent polluters from cheating in the auction, achieve the social welfare 
optimization, and provide the environmental management departments with the theoretical basis and reference methods to realize the fairness and 
effectiveness of initial allocation of emission permits.  
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1. Introduction 
With the intensity of global environmental problems, the task of managing environmental pollution is 
increasingly becoming the focus of attention. The emission trading system emerges as required, it uses market means 
to achieve the lowest cost of pollution treatment and incentive the polluters to treat the pollution actively1,2. The 
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fairness and effectiveness of allocating initial emission permits is the premise and basis of emission trading, thus how 
to propose methods to allocate initial emission permits is the most important studying problem. 
Auction is a reasonable method to realize the fairness and validity of resource allocation and appears to be 
attractive in practice3. The discriminatory-price sealed bid auction is used to allocate SO2 emission permits by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency. A uniform-price sealed bid auction is utilized to allocate carbon emission permits 
in the US carbon market4. Consignment auctions are used quarterly to allocate initial permits in the California 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) market. Betz and Seifert5 propose an ascending clock auction for allocating greenhouse gas 
emission permits. Rao and Zhao3,6 study mechanisms for allocating initial emission permits based on the uniform-
price sealed bid auction. Ding and Wang7 consider a hybrid auction-bargaining mechanism to alleviate distortion by 
excessive allowance in initial emission permits markets.  
However, most of research findings are attached with the assumption of private values that each polluter knows 
the value of emission permits to himself. Indeed, other polluters may possess information that would, if know to a 
particular polluter, affect the value he assigns to emission permits8. This information structure is called interdependent 
values. The auction methods for initial allocation of emission permits with interdependent values are few. Li and 
Huang9 study the bidding strategies and expected benefits of polluters with interdependent values in a second-price 
auction and a first-price auction for allocating initial emission permits.  
In this paper, we regard initial emission permits as homogeneous and divisible goods and consider polluters have 
interdependent values. Then, based on the auction mechanism design theory10, we design a novel multi-unit auction 
mechanism with interdependent values to allocate initial emission permits. We prove that this auction mechanism not 
only can incentive polluters to declare their truthful signals of marginal value, but also can realize the fairness and 
effectiveness of allocating initial emission permits and optimize the social welfare.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some assumptions and definitions, and establishes 
an auction mechanism designing model for allocating initial emission permits according to the assumptions. Section 
3 proposes the multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values by solving the model and gives the detail 
steps to show how to implement the auction mechanism in practice. Section 4 gives an application example to show 
how to implement the auction mechanism proposed by this paper.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Preliminaries 
We assume that the environmental management department wants to sell m  units of the emission permit to n  
polluters. The vector of all polluters’ signals is denoted as 1 2( , , )nt t t t L . it  is polluter i ’ private signal decided 
by his treatment cost and only known by himself. The environmental management department and other polluters are 
uncertainty about the real value of it . They regard it  as an random variable which is distributed on [ , ]i i iT t t  with 
the distribution function ( )i iF t  and associated density function ( )i if t . All signals are independently distributed. 
Polluter i ’ value for emission permits depends on his own signal as well as the signals of other polluters. Then 
polluter i ’s marginal value for the k -th emission permit is described by a function ( )ikv t . Function ( )ikv g  is 
nonnegative, differentiable and strictly increasing in it . Suppose the marginal values decreases with the increasing 
number of units, i.e., 1( ) ( )ik ikv t v tt , and a polluter’s own information has a greater influence on his own marginal 
values than it does on the other polluters’  marginal values. 
In this paper, we propose a multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values to allocate initial emission 
permits which works as follows. Each polluter reports his signal and marginal value functions. By applying our 
mechanism, the environmental management department can determine winners and their respective payments. Thus, 
a multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values can be written as { , }Q M . Given the vector of announced 
signals t , a generic element ( ) {0,1}ikQ t   indicates whether or not polluter i  receives at least k  units, and 
( ) 0iM t t  is polluter i ’s payment to the environmental management department. 
Given a mechanism { , }Q M , when all polluters report their signals truthfully , the ex post utility of polluter i  
is 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m
i ik ik i
k
U t v t Q t M t
 
 ¦                                                                     (1) 
Because signals are private information of polluters, a polluter maybe lie about his signal to maximize his ex post 
utility. When polluter i  has a true signal it  but reports $ $,i i i it t t Tz  , and all other polluters report truthfully, the ex 
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post utility of polluter i  is 
$ $
1
( ) ( , ) ( , )
m
ik ik i i i i i
k
v t Q t t M t t 
 
¦                                                             (2) 
The objective of emission trading is to decrease the cost of the pollution treatment of the whole society. As initial 
allocation of emission permits is the basis of emission trading, the environmental management department should 
choose an auction mechanism that can realize fair and efficient allocation of resources, among all multi-unit auction 
mechanism with interdependent values that can induce all polluters declare their signals truthfully. 
Therefore, a multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values ),( MQ  can be acquired by solving the 
following maximization problem (D): 
{ , }
1 1
max ( ) ( )
n m
ik ikQ M i k
v t Q t
  
¦¦
                                                                 (3) 
 Subject to             $, , ii t t ,      $ $
1
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
m
i ik ik i i i i i
k
U t v t Q t t M t t 
 
t ¦                                                      (4) 
,i t                                      ( ) 0iU t t                                                                              (5) 
t 
1 1
0 ( )
n m
ik
i k
Q t m
  
d d¦¦                                                             (6) 
Condition (4) is the ex post incentive compatibility constraint, i.e., the ex post utility of each polluter is 
maximized if he reveals his true signal, when other polluters also reveal truthfully. Condition (5) is the ex post 
individual rationality constraint, i.e., every polluter should receive a non-negative ex post utility from participating in 
the mechanism. Condition (6) says that the number of emission permits allocated to all polluters is at most m  units. 
3. Multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values 
According to the objective function of problem (D), the environmental management department would like to 
allocate emission permits that are associated with the m  highest value. Therefore, ordering of the marginal value ikv  
will be necessary to characterize the efficient auction mechanism. Let ( )kv  be the k -th highest value. 
From the assumption that ( )ikv g  is strictly increasing in it , we get that ( )ikQ t  is nondecreasing in it . Moreover, 
from the assumption that a polluter’s own information has a greater influence on his own marginal values than it does 
on the other polluters’ marginal values, we can denote the smallest signal for polluter i  allocated the k -th unit as *ikt , 
i.e., * ( 1)inf{ | ( , ) ( , ), }ik i ik i i m i i i it z v z t v z t z T   t  . By the assumption that the marginal values decreases with 
the increasing number of units, *ikt can be interpreted as the smallest signal for polluter i  allocated k  units. 
Then, the multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values * *( , )Q M  is stated as follows 
(1) The allocation rule is 
*
*                     
         
1
( )
0          
ik
i
i
k
if t t
otherwis
Q
e
t  !­®¯
                                                                  (7) 
(2) The payment rule is 
* * *
1
( ) (    , ) ( )
m
i i ik i ik
k
M t v t t Q t
 
 ¦
                                                                       (8) 
Now, I show the mechanism * *( , )Q M  is the solution of problem (D). 
First, according to the objective function and condition (6) of problem (D), the solution * ( )ikQ t  is equal to 1 for 
m  terms with the largest marginal value ( )ikv g  and equal to 0 for others. From the expression of 
*
ikt , it’s clear that  
emission permits should be allocated to polluter if his *it  is bigger than 
*
ikt . Thus, 
*Q is given as in (7). 
Second, define the payment rule *M  as 
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* * *
1
( , )
( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( , ) )
i
i
m t ik i
i ik ik ik it
k
v y tM t v t Q t Q y t dy
y


 
w  w¦ ³                                                  (9) 
Then, when all polluters report their signals truthfully, the expost utility of polluter i  can be rewritten as 
*
1
( , )
( ) ( , )
i
i
m t ik i
i ik it
k
v y tU t Q y t dy
y


 
w w¦³                                                  (10) 
When polluter i  has a true signal it  but reports $ $,i i i it t t Tz  , and other polluters report truthfully, the ex post 
utility of polluter i  can be rewritten as 
$ $
$
* *
1
( , )
[( ( ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) ]
i
i
m t ik i
ik ik i i ik i i ik it
k
v y t
v t v t t Q t t Q y t dy
y

  
 
w  w¦ ³                              (11) 
 (10) and (11) imply 
$ $
$
* *
1
( , )
[( ( ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) ]
i
i
m t ik i
ik ik i i ik i i ik it
k
v y t
v t v t t Q t t Q y t dy
y

  
 
w  w¦ ³                            (12) 
From the deduction that ( )ikQ t  is nondecreasing in it , we have 
$ $
$ $ $* * *
1 1 1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( ( ) ( , )) ( , )
i i
i i
m m mt tik i ik i
ik i ik i i ik ik i i ik i it t
k k k
v y t v y tQ y t dy Q t t dy v t v t t Q t t
y y
 
   
   
w wt  w w¦ ¦ ¦³ ³  
(13) 
Thus, $ $
1
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
m
i ik ik i i i i i
k
U t v t Q t t M t t 
 
t ¦ , (4) is satisfied  
By (10), we get ( ) 0iU t t , (5) is satisfied. 
From the definition of *it , the payment rule 
*M defined in (9) is equivalent to (8). 
Therefore, * *( , )Q M  is the multi-unit auction mechanism with interdependent values which can realize 
efficient allocation of initial emission permits. 
From above analysis, we give the concrete implementation steps of the auction designed by this paper. 
(1) The environmental management department announces the adopted auction mechanism, the amount of 
emission permits and qualification requirements of bidding polluters on specified websites. 
(2) The environmental management department checks the qualification of polluters who would like to bid for 
emission permits. If qualified, the polluter will be given an account. 
(3) Polluter i  enters the bidding system by his account, and inputs his signal it  and marginal value functions 
( )ikv t , then the system checks the bid for validity. 
(4) The environmental management department puts data into problem (D), and uses Lingo to compute the 
allocation results *Q . 
(5) The environmental management department uses equation (8) to compute the payment results *M . 
4. An application example 
It’s supposed that the environmental management department wants to auction a number of SO2 emission permits. 
According to the size of emission market, we define 100 ton/year of SO2 emission right as one unit, so there are 
3m   units of SO2 emission permits for sale. There are 3n   polluters participate in the auction.The signals of the 
three polluters are 1 48t  , 2 62t  , 3 42t   respectively, and their marginal value functions are as follows: 
11 1 3( ) 4 2v t t t  , 12 1 3( ) 3 2v t t t  , 21 1 2 3( ) 0.5 3v t t t t   , 31 2 3( ) 2 4v t t t  , 32 2 3( ) 3v t t t  ,
13 22 23 33( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0v t v t v t v t    . 
First, substitute above marginal value functions in the objective function of problem (D), and from condition (6), 
we get the following integer programming model. 
1 3 11 1 3 12 1 2 3 21 2 3 31 2 3 32max[(4 2 ) ( ) (3 2 ) ( ) (0.5 3 ) ( ) (2 4 ) ( ) ( 3 ) ( )]t t Q t t t Q t t t t Q t t t Q t t t Q t         
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1 1
0 ( ) 3
n m
ik
i k
Q t
  
d d¦¦  
Put the value of signals into above model, and use Lingo, we can obtain 11 21 31( ) ( ) ( ) 1Q t Q t Q t   .  
Second, compute the smallest signals for polluter 1, 2, and 3 allocated a unit of the SO2 emission permit, we get 
*
11 26t  , *21 46t  , *31 26t  . By equation (8), the payments of polluters are *1 ( ) 188M t  , *2 ( ) 228M t  ,
*
3 ( ) 228M t  . 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the problem of initial allocation of emission permits, and present a multi-unit auction 
mechanism based on two assumptions, i.e., all polluters have interdependent values, and each polluter submits a 
private signal and marginal values which are declining in the number of units obtained. Theoretical analysis shows 
that the auction mechanism not only can achieve incentive compatibility and individual rationality for polluters, but 
also can realize the fair and effective allocation of initial emission permits and optimize the social welfare. Moreover, 
an application example is given to show the operability of the auction mechanism. Therefore, the results of our study 
can provide the environmental management departments with the theoretical basis and reference methods.  
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